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Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of 
Announcements 
 
We consider the strategic timing of information releases in a dynamic disclosure model. 
Because investors don’t know whether or when the firm is informed, the firm will not necessarily 
disclose immediately.  We show that bad market news can trigger the immediate release of 
information by firms.  Conversely, good market news slows the release of information by firms.  
Thus, our model generates clustering of negative announcements.  Surprisingly, this result holds 
only when firms can preemptively disclose their own information prior to the arrival of external 
information. These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock 
returns. 
(JEL D8, G3, M4) 
One of the most important ingredients to the process of price discovery in financial markets 
is the flow of new information.  The importance of information flow is perhaps most apparent 
during times of market “crisis,” when it often seems that bad news is being reported 
simultaneously from multiple sources.  This clustering of news could occur because firms learn 
more during bad times, or because firms strategically time the release of information.  Indeed, it 
has long been recognized in the literature that corporate news disclosures are controlled by self-
interested agents, and a number of theoretical and empirical analyses have found support for the 
idea that given this discretion, managers may choose to delay the release of bad news.
1
As hinted above, in addition to delays in the  release of information, casual observation 
suggests that disclosures of bad news are often clustered in bad times.  While it is not surprising 
that firms’ news are affected by market and sector conditions (given the correlation of their cash 
flows), the timing of the announcements is suggestive that these disclosure decisions are not 
made independently.  Indeed, recent empirical work by Tse and Tucker (2007), who employ a 
  
                                                 
1 See for example Dye (1990), Rajan (1994), Dye and Sridhar (1995), Genotte and Trueman (1996), Burgstahler and 
Dichev (1997), and Shin (2003), among others. Empirical support can be found in Miller (2002) who compares 
voluntary disclosures by firms that enjoy strong earnings performance to firms that experience earnings declines. He 
finds an increase in voluntary disclosures during periods of increased earnings. 
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duration model to study whether managers “herd” in announcing earnings warnings, finds that 
earnings warnings within an industry are clustered and that firms speed up their warnings in 
response to poor market conditions.  In contrast, they show that such clustering is asymmetric in 
that good news does not generate such clustering.  
In this paper, we seek an endogenous explanation for this asymmetry in the clustering of 
disclosure of good and bad news.   We study disclosure dynamics when a firm possesses 
information that is correlated with market conditions, and explore managers’ incentives to delay 
the  disclosure of bad news, as opposed to good news,  until market conditions worsen and 
become public knowledge.   In particular, we examine a dynamic game in which a manager of a 
firm decides when to report information regarding the value of the firm he manages. The 
manager maximizes the present value of her expected compensation, where the rate of 
compensation at each point in time is proportional to the market value of the firm conditional on 
public information. Because investors are uncertain whether a manager has learned the 
information, in equilibrium only those firms that have sufficiently positive news will release their 
information.  Firms with more negative information will prefer to keep their market value higher 
– at least temporarily – by claiming that they do not yet have any information to report.    
We then extend the model by supposing that in addition to the disclosure by the manager 
there is an external public signal about market conditions that will arrive at a future date. As 
alluded to earlier, while the timing of the  firm’s information is uncorrelated with market 
conditions, we assume the value of the firm is correlated with this market news.  Therefore, the 
public news announcement will affect the market value of the firm.  Our goal is to understand 
whether these interactions can lead to clustering in the release of information by firms even 
when the arrival of the underlying information is not clustered.   
We begin our analysis in section I where we introduce a static framework which is the basis 
of our analysis. While our main contribution lies in the dynamic extension of the model, we 
provide a new characterization of the static equilibrium which is of independent interest. It is 
also useful in characterizing the equilibrium in a dynamic model which we next examine.  
In Section I we also establish a negative benchmark result: We show that if public news is 
released before the firm is informed, then the external news has no effect on the firm’s ex-post 
rate of disclosure.  Thus, absent the firm’s ability to preemptively disclose its information prior 3 
to the public news, there is no relation between the news announcement and the timing of 
disclosures.  
This result might appear surprising.  If the news about market conditions is bad, this will 
cause the market value of the firm to fall.  This drop in value provides an incentive to release 
information if it is not as bad as the market now expects.  That is, the release of negative external 
information lowers the threshold for disclosure, as the relative interpretation of the firm’s news 
will become more favorable.  However, we demonstrate that this simple intuition is not sufficient 
for the clustering of disclosures.  This is because while negative news about market conditions 
does indeed lower the threshold for which the firm will disclose, it also lowers the posterior 
distribution of the firm’s type.  We show that generally, and perhaps surprisingly, these effects 
cancel out and there is no clustering; that is, the probability that the firm will disclose is 
independent of the level of the public news about the economy.  
In Section II we introduce a simple dynamic model and assume that the probability that the 
firm is informed is fixed. The manager is either informed at t = 0 or not at all. Public news is 
released at date t1 > 0.  Thus, in contrast to the prior setting, the firm has the opportunity to 
disclose its information before or after the public news announcement.    In the resulting dynamic 
disclosure game, because disclosure is irreversible, the firm faces a real options problem with 
regard  to its disclosure decision: disclosing positive information may raise the stock price 
immediately, but gives up the option that the external public news would have had an even more 
positive impact on the stock price if the firm had not yet disclosed.  As a result, information 
disclosure is delayed relative to the no news case.  However, once the public news is released, 
we show that if it is sufficiently negative it may trigger an immediate disclosure by the firm. For 
sufficiently negative news the probability of disclosure is strictly decreasing in the news quality. 
Above this threshold the probability is zero, independent of the news’ quality. Thus we have the 
first main result of the paper -- we show that the release of negative public news can trigger the 
release of information by the firm.   
In Section III we consider a more realistic framework and assume that the firm learns its 
information at a random time (rather than only at date 0) so that the probability it is informed 
increases over time. We find that there will be an “information blackout” period prior to the 
news, when firms refrain from voluntary disclosures. When we consider the clustering effect, 4 
which is the focus of our paper, we find a stronger effect. The triggering of immediate disclosure 
following  negative news is more pronounced. Because of the information blackout, the 
probability of disclosure is strictly decreasing in the news quality for the entire range of possible 
public news. Also, in addition to negative public news “triggering” an immediate disclosure, 
positive public news announcements will slow the rate of disclosure at future dates. 
Thus, the possibility of clustering emerges in our setting only if the firm has at least some 
likelihood of receiving its information prior to the arrival of external information and the 
opportunity to preempt the release of external information by disclosing its own signal first.  The 
results of  Sections  II  and  III  show that clustering arises in a dynamic setting due to the 
endogeneity of the ordering of the disclosure decision. The key is that in such a setting, the 
distribution of types who have not yet disclosed when the public news about the state of the 
economy comes out is an endogenous subset of the original support.  We show that in this case 
the threshold effects outweigh the distributional effects of the public news, and clustering 
emerges. The intuition for this asymmetry is that when market conditions are negative then it is 
likely that the firm’s news was also negative and it is more probable that it did not yet disclose 
this information beforehand, whereas when market conditions are positive it is more likely the 
firm has already disclosed its information.  
A. Related Literature 
Milgrom (1981) and Grossman (1981) were the first to examine disclosure of verifiable 
information and showed that if it is common knowledge that an agent is informed then all types 
will disclose. Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) showed that when it is not common 
knowledge then there will be only partial disclosure; our model builds on this observation. 
Dye and Sridhar (1995) is perhaps the most closely related paper as it considers a model with 
n firms, each of which may or may not have privately observed a signal. If a firm gets a signal it 
can disclose it in period 1 or 2. These features of their model are similar to ours. However, they 
assume that whether firms observe a signal  or not is positively correlated, but the signals 
themselves are independent. This is exactly the dual of our assumption that signals are correlated 
but their arrival process is independent. As a result, in their model, it is more disclosures in 
period 1 that leads to more disclosures in period 2 (since investors believe that non-disclosing 
firms have adverse information), whereas in our model, it is the nature of disclosure (good news 5 
or bad news) that delays or triggers disclosure by other firms. Hence, a key difference is that they 
assume the information arrival process is itself correlated. In contrast, in our model clustering of 
disclosures is due only to the strategic element and in particular not due to the correlated arrival 
of information.  Another crucial difference between their results and ours is that in our model, 
clustering is not symmetric in the quality of news.  Specifically, when information arrival is 
correlated as in Dye and Sridhar, there is no difference in clustering of good news or bad news; 
in contrast, when information is correlated but not its arrival as in our model, there is clustering 
of bad news but not of good news.   
I.  A Static Model of Disclosure 
We begin with a simple static model of disclosure which will form the basis for our dynamic 
model. In particular, we show that when the firm does not disclose information, investors’ beliefs 
about the firm are the “worst possible” beliefs given any disclosure rule.  Finally, we consider 
the impact of ex ante news announcements on disclosure, and establish an irrelevance result 
regarding the probability of disclosure that will provide an important contrast to our main result 
in the dynamic setting. 
A. The Model 
Consider a single firm whose manager may learn some information relevant to the firm’s 
value.  Let the manager’s signal S be the value of the firm conditional on this new information.
2  
The manager learns this information with probability p ∈ [0,1].  Once the manager is informed, 
with probability q both the manager’s signal and the fact that the manager is informed remain  
private information.  When privately informed, the manager has discretion regarding the release 
of the information:  The manager may either disclose it or conceal it, but if it is disclosed it is 
verifiable and cannot be manipulated.
3  With probability 1− q  the manager is “publicly” 
informed and so does not have discretion over  the  information’s  release; in that case, the 
manager  reports  it  immediately to the market.
4
                                                 
2 This assumption is essentially without loss of generality and is equivalent to assuming the manager learns 
information I and the firm’s value is V, and then defining S = E[ V | I ]. 
  We denote the events that the manager is 
3 This assumption of “verifiable reports” is common to the literature. See, for example, Shin (2003, 2006). 
4 This case captures situations in which either (i) the information itself is public, (ii) the fact that the manager has 
learned the information is public (in which case immediate full disclosure will occur in equilibrium), or (iii)  hiding 
the information would be too costly (perhaps due to legal concerns). 6 
uninformed, informed with discretion, and informed with no discretion as {U, D, ND}  The 
distribution of the signal S may depend on whether the manager is informed or not; we write Si to 
represent the signal conditional on the event i. For convenience, we assume that SD is non-
degenerate and continuously distributed on some (possibly unbounded) interval, and that E[SU] ≥ 
E[SD].    The latter ensures that an agent who holds negative information may benefit from 
pretending to be uninformed. We should also note that while our model is based on Dye (1985) 
and Jung and Kwon (1988), we let the distribution of the signal depend on whether the manager 
is informed, which is not allowed in their analysis.  We introduce this more general setup as in a 
dynamic framework the set of agents with discretion to disclose at time t depends  on who 
discloses beforehand. Hence the distribution of types differs from the distribution of agents who 
are uninformed. 
The manager’s objective is to maximize the firm’s market value, which is its value 
conditional on the information available to investors.  Because the signal S is the firm’s expected 
value, if the manager discloses the signal the firm’s market value will simply be S.   If the 
manager does not disclose, the firm’s market value will be based on the information contained in 
the fact that the manager did not disclose.  Naturally, the manager is willing to disclose S if and 
only if it exceeds the value the firm would have without disclosing, and so the manager will 
disclose if 
    S ≥  E[ S | nondisclosure ].  (1) 
B. Equilibrium and Worst Case Beliefs 
Equation (1) implies that only firms with a signal higher than some threshold x will disclose 
their information.  Consider the case in which it is public knowledge that the manager is 
informed (i.e., p = 1 or q = 0), but investors do not know the manager’s information.  In that case 
the manager would not disclose only if S ≤ x*, so that from (1) the equilibrium threshold x* 
satisfies 
    x* = E[ S | nondisclosure ] = E[ S | S ≤ x* ].  (2)   
This equation has the unique solution that x* is the minimum of the support of S, and all 
information is disclosed.  This result replicates the standard “unraveling” result – noted, e.g., by 7 
Ross (1979), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981) and others – that if the market knows for sure 
that a firm holds some information then in equilibrium the firm will disclose its information.  
When p < 1 and q > 0, however, investors do not know if the manager is informed.  In that 
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Note that the function  (,) S hx ρ  is decreasing in ρ, and because S is continuously distributed, 
is also differentiable. 
Equation (3) expresses the equilibrium threshold as a fixed point of the function h.  While the 
precise solution to (3)  will depend on the distribution of S, we have the following useful 
characterization, which generalizes the intuition that in the absence of disclosure, investors will 
adopt the “worst case beliefs.” 
PROPOSITION 1.  Equation (3) has a unique solution x
* which is the equilibrium 
disclosure threshold.  This threshold is decreasing with ρ and satisfies 
   
* min ( , ) xS x hx = ρ   (4) 
The value of the firm in the event of non-disclosure is also equal to x
*, and this value is 
the lowest possible given any disclosure policy (threshold or not).  
Proof of PROPOSITION 1:  A fixed point 
** ( ,) S x hx = ρ  clearly exists given the continuity of h 
and  ( ,) [ ] SU h ES −∞ ρ = > −∞   while  1
11 (,) [ ] [ ] S UD h ES ES
ρ
+ρ +ρ ∞ρ = + <∞ .  Now consider  any 8 
alternative disclosure policy Γ (threshold or not) and let  ( ) ( )  or   and  v ESU D S  Γ =∈Γ  .  If Γ 
differs from the policy with threshold x
*, then either it includes types greater than x
*, or excludes 
types less than x
*.  In either case, v(Γ) > x
*.  Thus the equilibrium x
* must uniquely satisfy (4).  
Finally, because E[SU] ≥ E[SD], hS decreases with ρ, and therefore so does the threshold.  \qed   
 
Equation (4) can be interpreted as generalization of the intuition from the standard full-
disclosure equilibrium in (2):  Investors interpret non-disclosure as pessimistically as possible, so 
that the equilibrium threshold is the one that leads to the lowest value for the firm in the event of 
non-disclosure.  Not surprisingly, because h  declines with ρ, the threshold for disclosure 
decreases with the likelihood that the manager is privately informed.  Thus, conditional on the 
manager being privately informed, the probability of disclosure 
* Pr( ) D Sx >  increases. 
C. Ex Ante News: An Irrelevance Result 
Suppose that prior to the firm’s opportunity to disclose its information, investors and the 
manager observe public information that is correlated with the firm’s value.   This information 
may be from a public news source such as disclosures by analysts covering the industry, or 
correspond to a mandated disclosure of private information such as an earnings announcement 
by another firm in the industry.  We next consider the impact of such ex ante news on the 
likelihood of disclosure by the firm. 
To capture this correlation between the news and the firm’s signal, we denote the news 
announcement by the random variable Y, and suppose the firm’s signal S and the news Y are 
positively correlated, and related as follows:   
    S = µ(Y) + σ(Y) Z  (5) 
where  Z  is a random variable with mean of zero and independent of  Y,  µ  and  σ  are 
deterministic functions of Y,  and  µ  is strictly increasing in Y.  Note that this representation 
follows immediately from, but is more general than, an assumption that S and Y are joint normal.  
We assume that the distribution of Y is independent of whether the manager is informed (the 
events {U, D, ND}).  Note that the news announcement Y determines the conditional mean and 9 
variance of investors’ beliefs regarding the firm’s value prior to any disclosure.
5
First, the news announcement will have an immediate impact on the firm’s stock price as 
investors revise their expectations.  Because the manager will only disclose S in order to raise the 
stock price, holding fixed the manager’s signal S, negative news will make it more likely that the 
manager will disclose this information.  In other words, the equilibrium disclosure threshold will 
move with the quality of the news. 
  How will this 
news affect the manager’s disclosure decision? 
However, while the impact of the news on the disclosure threshold affects the probability of 
disclosure of a given type S, the distribution of the manager’s type is also affected by the news.  
Specifically, the worse the news, the lower the likelihood that the manager’s information S will 
exceed a given threshold.  Indeed, as the following result demonstrates, this second effect 
completely offsets the first so that despite the change in the disclosure threshold, the probability 
of disclosure is independent of the news Y.   
PROPOSITION 2.  Given the ex ante news announcement Y, the equilibrium disclosure 
threshold for the firm is given by 
   
*() () ()* xY Y Yz =µ +σ   (6) 
where z
* is the disclosure threshold that solves (4) given the signal Z.  The probability 
that the firm discloses is independent of the news Y. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 2:  The equilibrium condition becomes 
 
**
| () ( () ,) SY xY h xY = ρ                (7) 
where  “S|Y” denotes that the expectations in (3)  are with respect to the conditional 
distribution of S.   Using  PROPOSITION  1  and the fact that the function h  is a conditional 
expectation and thus a linear operator, the equilibrium threshold x* = hS|Y(x*,ρ) = minz hS|Y(µ + 
σ z,ρ) = µ + σ minz hΖ(z,ρ) = µ + σ z∗, which implies (6). Moreover, the probability S exceeds 
the threshold is Pr(S > x*) = Pr(µ + σZ > µ + σ z∗) = Pr(Z > z∗), which is independent of the 
conditional mean and volatility of the signal.  \qed 
                                                 
5 For simplicity, we assume that firm’s signal S is a sufficient statistic for the firm’s value (and the manager’s 
payoff) given the news Y.  For a more general setting in which Y may also have an independent effect on the 
manager’s payoff, see Subsection IV.C.  10 
Thus, PROPOSITION 2 implies that ex ante news announcements should have no impact on 
disclosure rates.  Voluntary disclosures should be observed with a similar frequency after good 
or bad public news.  As we will show in the next section, this symmetry will no longer hold in a 
setting in which firms have the opportunity to disclose both before and after the public news is 
revealed. 
Remark.  In the special case of joint normality, where both the conditional and unconditional 
distributions of S are normal and thus differ only in terms of mean and variance, the probability 
that the firm discloses is not only independent of the news Y, but is also equal to the probability 
the firm discloses absent any news whatsoever.     
II.  Dynamic Disclosure: Delay and Downward Clustering 
We now consider a simple dynamic version of the disclosure game, in which the manager has 
the opportunity to disclose his information either before or after the external news is revealed.  
By giving the manager discretion over the timing of the disclosure, two effects emerge.  First, a 
manager with a sufficiently high signal will choose to preempt the news announcement and 
disclose immediately.  However, a manager with a more intermediate signal may choose to delay 
disclosure, and wait to see if good external news will raise the stock price above his signal.  If 
the external news is poor, however, the manager will then disclose his information immediately 
after the news announcement.  Thus, relative to the static model, disclosures are delayed prior to 
the news, and disclosures tend to cluster just after negative news announcements. 
A. Basic Dynamic Model 
As before, the manager learns the firm’s value S at date 0 with probability p, and with 
probability q the manager has discretion regarding whether to disclose his information to the 
market.  Now, the manager can disclose his information at any time t ∈ [0, Τ], after which the 
value becomes public information.   At an interim date t1 ∈ (0, Τ), the news Y is announced.
6
                                                 
6 For simplicity we assume in this section that the manager learns his information at date 0 if at all, and the timing of 
the news announcement is known.  We consider the case in which the manager may learn his information at any 
time and the news may arrive at any time in Sections 
  
For simplicity, we assume that Y only affects the conditional mean of the signal S, so that σ(Y) in 
(5) is a (positive) constant σ  (as would be true with joint normality).  
III and IV. 11 
Let It be the information that is public at time t.  Then, assuming risk-neutral investors and 
normalizing the interest rate to zero, the market value of the firm on date t is given by  ˆt s  = E[ S | 
It ].  We assume the manager’s payoff is increasing in the market value of the firm at any 
moment in time.  The exact form of this payoff will not affect the qualitative results, and for 
simplicity we represent the payoff to the manager of the firm as 
   
0
ˆ () ( ) t
T
t
u dt s t
=
λ ∫   (8) 
where  u  is increasing and  the weights λ(t)  ∈  (0,1)  may reflect, e.g., discounting or 
fluctuations in the sensitivity of the manager’s wage to the share price.   
B. Ex-Post Disclosure and Clustering 
Given our timing assumptions, information is only learned at date 0 and at the time of the 
news announcement.  Thus, in equilibrium disclosure will occur, if at all, at date 0 or t1.
7
Suppose the date 0 disclosure decision can be characterized by some threshold x0, so that 
types S > x0 disclose at date 0.  (We will analyze the determination of x0 shortly.)  As in the static 
model, at date t1 a manager who has not yet disclosed will choose to do so only if his signal 
exceeds the firm’s share price absent disclosure.  Let x1(Y) be the disclosure threshold at date t1 
given Y.  Then 
  
Consider the optimal disclosure policy at date t1, once the public news Y is revealed.   
    1 | 01 ( ) nondisclosure, (min( , ( )), ). SY xY ES Y h x xY =  = ρ    (9) 
Note that in (9), we calculate the expected value of the firm given nondisclosure by 
recognizing that an informed manager with type S > min(x0, x1(Y)) would have disclosed, either 
initially or after the news.  As long as x1(Y) ≤ x0, condition (9) is the same fixed point condition 
as in the static model (see (7)), and thus the characterization in PROPOSITION 2 applies.  But if 
x1(Y) > x0, then a manager with type S ∈ [x0, x1(Y)) will have disclosed his type initially but will 
regret that decision once the public news is revealed.  Because the static equilibrium minimizes 
the firm’s nondisclosure share price (PROPOSITION 1), this “excessive” disclosure relative to the 
                                                 
7 In other words, the model in this case is equivalent to a two-period model.  We have set it up more generally, 
however, to accommodate important extensions in subsequent sections. 12 
static case will raise the firm’s nondisclosure share price relative to the static equilibrium.  Thus 
we have the following characterization of the post-news disclosure threshold:  
PROPOSITION 3.  Suppose the date 0 disclosure threshold is x0.  Then the optimal 
disclosure threshold at date t1 once the news Y is revealed is given by 
( )
*
1() () xY xY kY = +             (10) 
where x
∗ is defined as in (6) and the function k is continuous and strictly increasing if 
*() xY> x0.  If 
*() xY≤ x0, or equivalently, Y ≤ y0 ≡ µ
-1(x0 – σz
*), then k(Y) = 0. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 3:  Suppose 
*() xY≤ x0.  Then x1(Y) = µ(Y) + σ z∗ ≤ x0, and so (9) 
holds.  For 
*() xY> x0,  
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≡+   
Because z∗ is a unique minimum of hZ, k is positive and strictly increasing. \qed 
Note that firms who have not disclosed at date 0 will choose to once Y is revealed at date 
t1 only if the ex-post threshold is sufficiently low so that x1(Y) < x0.  Thus, we have the 
result that disclosures are likely to cluster immediately following negative news 
announcements, as summarized in the corollary to PROPOSITION 3 below: 
THEOREM I.  When the manager learns private information at date 0 (if at all), then the 
manager will either disclose the information immediately at date 0, or just after the public 
news announcement at date t1.  A post news announcement will only occur if Y ≤ y0, with 
the likelihood of such an announcement being higher if the news Y is lower. 13 
C. Ex-Ante Disclosure and Delay 
Having characterized the optimal disclosure policy for the firm once the news Y has been 
released at date t1, we consider next the equilibrium level of preemptive disclosure at date 0.  In 
our prior analysis, we used the equilibrium condition that the manager would disclose if the 
signal S exceeded the firm’s market value.  In the case of preemptive disclosure, however, a real 
option problem emerges.  If a firm with signal S discloses at date 0, then the market value of the 
firm will equal S from that point onward.  If it does not disclose at date 0, there is a chance that 
the news Y will be sufficiently positive that its market value will exceed S for some time if it 
delays disclosure.  Disclosing at date 0 forfeits this option.  Thus, the firm will not disclose at 
date 0 unless its immediate gain from disclosing exceeds the value of this option. 
If the manager discloses if and only if the signal S exceeds a threshold 0 x , then from the 
analysis in Section I the firm’s market value absent disclosure is given by  0 ( ,) S hxρ .  In that case, 
the immediate gain from disclosing at date 0 given signal S is u(S) − u( 0 ( ,) S hxρ ).  Because the 
market value of a non-disclosing firm on date t  ≥  t1  is  x1(Y), the potential gain from not 
disclosing at date t is (u(x1(Y)) −  u(S))
+.  Then, from (8), a firm with signal S prefers to disclose 
if 
    ( ) ( )
1
01 01 () ( ) ( , ) () ( ) ( ) . S t u S u h x dt E t u x Y u S dt S
∞ +  λ − ρ> λ −         ∫∫   (11) 
If we define 
1
10 () () t dt t dt
∞
α≡ λ λ ∫∫ , then the equilibrium disclosure threshold satisfies
8
   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 0 1 00 ( ,) () ( ) . S ux uh x E uxY ux S x
+  = ρ +α − =  
  (12) 
The real option component thus implies the following result for the firm’s ex-ante disclosure 
policy: 
                                                 
8 Guaranteeing a threshold strategy is optimal requires showing that if (11) holds for S, then it holds for all S′ > S.  In 
the appendix we demonstrate weak sufficient conditions for this result, but as a practical matter, we can solve for x0 
assuming a threshold, and then verify optimality ex post (which is the case for all examples we have considered).  In 
any case, none of our qualitative results depend on the optimality of a threshold strategy prior to the news 
announcement. 14 
PROPOSITION 4.  The ex-ante disclosure threshold x0 exceeds the firm’s non-disclosure 
share price  0 ( ,) S hxρ , which exceeds the static disclosure threshold absent news x*.  That 
is,  
00 ( ,) S x hx >ρ > x
∗. 
Thus, the ex-post news announcement delays disclosure relative to the setting without 
news. 
Proof:  The first inequality follows immediately from (12) and the fact that α > 0, u is strictly 
increasing, and Pr(x1(Y) > S) > 0.  The second inequality follows directly from the characterization 
of x
∗ in PROPOSITION 1.  \qed 
The preceding result implies that, because of the real option effect, the anticipation of an 
external news announcement reduces the likelihood of an initial disclosure relative to the case 
with no news.  A natural question to consider is how this real option effect depends on the 
correlation between the news Y  and the firm’s signal S.  Interestingly, this relation is not 
monotone.  To see why, note that if the news Y is independent of, and thus uninformative about 
S, then the real option effect disappears and x0 = x
* (as in the case with no news).  On the other 
hand, if S  and  Y  are perfectly correlated (σ  = 0), then the news will perfectly reveal the 
manager’s signal and again the real option has no value and x0 = x
*.  Only in the intermediate 
case when the news is informative, but not perfectly so, will x0 exceed the no news case.  We 
illustrate this result in Figure 1, which shows the disclosure threshold and the non-disclosure 
share price for the case in which S and Y have joint standard normal distributions, the likelihood 
ratio that the manager is informed  9, ρ = and the manager puts a relative weight of  30 α =  on the 
firm’s future stock price.
9
                                                 
9 These parameters correspond to a setting in which the manager is very likely to be informed a few days prior to the 
news announcement, but might be able to delay disclosing any information for many weeks. 
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Figure 1:  The Effect of Pending News Announcements on Ex-ante Disclosure Thresholds  
 
But while the presence of news reduces the likelihood of an initial disclosure, it has an 
opposite effect on the ultimate rate of disclosure.  In particular, note that the probability that the 
firm would disclose if the news were revealed ex ante is independent of the news Y, and in the 
case of joint normality, equal to the disclosure rate with no news.  However, when the news is 
good, some firms that disclosed at date 0 will regret their decision, so that in these states the 
overall disclosure rate exceeds the no news case.  Thus, while the initial disclosure rate declines, 
the ultimate disclosure rate is increased by the presence of external news. And of course, the total 
amount of information ultimately released is improved, as investors will learn the news even in 
the absence of any disclosure. 
III.  Stochastic Information Arrival 
In the basic dynamic model in Section II, the manager learns the signal S at date t = 0 or not 
at all. As a result, disclosures only occurred at date 0 or immediately after sufficiently negative 
public news.  In this section we examine the case where the date at which the manager may learn 
the signal S is itself stochastic, and thus the manager may learn the firm’s type at any time.  
Specifically, we let p(t) denote the cumulative probability that the firm is informed by date t, and 
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firm’s type).  In this case, disclosures can occur at any time.  We will show two new effects that 
arise when there is an external news announcement: (i) there will be an “information blackout” 
period prior to the news, when firms refrain from voluntary disclosures; and (ii) in addition to 
negative public news “triggering” an immediate disclosure, positive public news announcements 
will slow the rate of disclosure. 
A. The No Preemption Benchmark 
As a useful benchmark, we begin by examining the case in which the public news 
announcement occurs at date 0, so there is no possibility for the firm to preempt the news.   
Recall that in the static model in Section I, we established that in this case the public news has no 
impact on the probability of disclosure.  Here we characterize the equilibrium and extend that 
result to the dynamic setting when p(t) increases over time.  
Recall from the static model in Section I that the disclosure threshold is decreasing in ρ, the 
relatively likelihood that the manager is privately informed.  When p(t) increases over time, the 










.                  (13) 
As  ρ(t)  increases, the fact that the manager has not disclosed is more likely due to the 
manager’s unwillingness to disclose rather than his ignorance.  Thus, we would expect investors’ 
valuation of the firm, conditional on nondisclosure, to decline over time.  Absent future news, 
this anticipated price decline implies that there is no option value to waiting to disclose, and the 
optimal disclosure decision is again the myopic one: The manager will disclose if and when his 
signal exceeds the share price in the event of nondisclosure.  As a result, we have the following 
natural extension of our prior characterization of the equilibrium disclosure threshold, which we 
prove in the appendix: 
PROPOSITION 5.  Suppose the public news Y is revealed at date 0 and the probability p(t) 
that the manager is informed increases over time.  Then the disclosure threshold,  
   
*
| ( , ) min ( , ( )) np x S Y x Yt h x t = ρ   (14) 
is the unique equilibrium of the dynamic disclosure game, and decreases in t. 17 
Again, 
* (,) np x Yt decreases over time as it becomes clearer that the reason for 
nondisclosure is that the firm’s type is low. In the limit as p(t) approaches one, all types 
would disclose and 
* (,) np x Yt drops to −∞.  Following PROPOSITION 2 and assuming σ(Y) 
= σ (for example, when the news and the manager’s signal are joint normal), we have  
   
* ( , ) ( ) *( ) np x Yt Y z t =µ +σ   (15) 
where z∗(t) is the equilibrium threshold at date t given signal Z.  Because µ is increasing in Y, 
for a given signal S, the firm will disclose more quickly in the event of bad news. Still, just as in 
Section I, the probability of disclosure is unaffected by Y:   
COROLLARY.  When the public news is announced at date 0, the probability of disclosure 
over any time interval is independent of the realization of the news Y, and coincides with 
the no news case. 
B. Dynamic Model with Preemption 
We now examine the case where the public news is revealed at date t1 so a firm can preempt 
the news by disclosing its signal beforehand. We let x(t) denote the threshold for disclosure for t 
< t1 before the public news is revealed, and x(Y,t) denote the post-news disclosure threshold for t 
> t1. 
Given the firm’s equilibrium disclosure strategy, absent disclosure the firm’s market value 
will be its expected value given that it has not yet disclosed, which we denote in this case by v(t).  
Then a firm with signal S will benefit from disclosing at date τ < t1  rather than wait until after 
the news announcement only if   
    ( ) ( )
1
1
* () ( ) () () ( ,) ( ) .
t
t t u S u v t dt E t u x Y t u S dt S
+ ∞
τ
  λ − >λ −      ∫∫   (16) 
By the same real option argument as in Section II, the disclosure threshold exceeds the 
nondisclosure share price, which exceeds the no preemption threshold: 
* () () () np xt vt x t >> .  
Now, while the right-hand side of (16) is strictly positive and independent of τ, the left-hand side 
of (16) tends to 0 as τ approaches 1.  Therefore, for any signal, there is a point in time such that 
the firm would rather wait for the release of the public news before deciding whether to disclose 18 
its information.  Intuitively, the option value of waiting exceeds the benefit of increasing its 
stock price for a very short interval of time.   
This observation implies that the equilibrium threshold strategy, x(t), prior to the release of 
public news satisfies x(t) → ∞ as t → t1. We refer to this as an information blackout, as it states 
that voluntary disclosures should be very rare just prior to public news announcements whose 
timing is known.
10
Turning to the post-news strategy,  recall from Section 
 
II  that the post-news  disclosure 
threshold will coincide with the no preemption case when it is below the pre-news disclosure 
threshold.  We can extend this result to case with stochastic news arrival as follows  (see 
appendix): 
PROPOSITION 6.  Let xmin  ≡ min{x(t) | t < t1} be the lowest ex-ante disclosure threshold.  
Then the equilibrium ex post disclosure threshold can be characterized as follows: 
* (,) (,) (,) np xYt x Yt KYt = +                 (17) 
where K(Y, t) = 0 if 
*
min (,) np x Yt x ≤ , and otherwise, K(Y, t) is strictly increasing in Y .  
We illustrate PROPOSITION 6 in Figure 2 below.  Note that prior to the news announcement 
at date t1, x(t) exceeds the threshold in the no preemption/no news case due to the real option 
effect.  This effect grows as t1 becomes near.  Once the public news is revealed, the threshold 
coincides with the no preemption case ( ) ( ,) L xy t when it is below xmin.  Above xmin, the threshold 
is elevated ( ) ( ,) ( ,) HH x yt K yt + due to the possibility that firms below the threshold may have 
disclosed early.  
                                                 
10 We note that in this case the equilibrium disclosure threshold is likely to be non-monotonic on [0,1].  For t near 0, 
the disclosure threshold may fall as p(t) increases, and then rise as t approaches 1 and the option value of delaying 
dominates.   19 
 
Figure 2:  Ex-ante and Ex-post Disclosure Thresholds with Stochastic Information Arrival 
 
Given this characterization of the disclosure threshold, we have the following implications.  
First, because of the “information blackout” effect, the disclosure threshold will always drop 
once the news is released.  Thus we have the following generalization of the clustering effect in 
Section II: 
THEOREM II.  There is a positive probability of an immediate disclosure at date t1 when 
the public news is released.  This probability strictly decreases with the quality of the 
news Y. 
Note  that this result is stronger than the result in Theorem I in that the probability of 
immediate disclosure is decreasing in the quality of the news for all Y, not just for Y sufficiently 
low. 
There is a second, new effect which arises in this case.  Because p(t) is increasing, there is a 
positive probability of disclosure after date t1.  This probability is independent of Y if x(Y,t) < 
xmin.  But for Y  such that x(Y,t)  >  xmin, because K(Y,t)  increases with Y, the probability of 
disclosure decreases with Y.  Hence, positive public news will slow the rate of ex-post 
disclosure:   20 
THEOREM III.  For t > s > t1 with p(t) > p(s), the probability of disclosure in the interval 
(s, t) decreases in Y if x(Y,s) > xmin, and is independent of Y  otherwise. 
 
IV.  Additional Extensions 
A. Stochastic News Arrival 
Until now we assumed the arrival date of the public news is common knowledge, as is often 
the case for government news releases and other forms of aggregate data.  A natural question is 
how our results would change if the timing of the public news is random.   
Suppose, for example, the arrival date of the public news has an exponential distribution with 
arrival rate γ, so that the probability that the news will arrive in the interval between t and t + dt, 
given that it has not yet arrived, is γ dt. 
Consider a firm’s decision whether to preempt the external information and release its 
information at time t as compared to the alternative of waiting until t + dt.  The gain from 
preempting at time t is given by  
  ( ) () ( ) () . t u S u v t dt λ−    
The potential loss is that the public news is released between t and t + dt and is sufficiently 
positive that the firm regrets having disclosed its signal.  The expected loss is given by: 
   
( )
* ( ) (,) () .
t dt dt E t u x Y t u S dt S
+ ∞
+
  γλ −    ∫
   
The equilibrium disclosure threshold should therefore satisfy 
   
( ) ( ) ( )
* 1* * () () () () ( ,) ( ) ().
t uxt uv t t E uxYt uS d S xt
+ ∞ −   = +γλ λ τ − τ =    ∫
 
This equation is very similar to the equation we obtained in (12). If, for example, the weights 
λ correspond to standard exponential discounting, then the only change over time comes from 
the increase in p(t).  In that case, the disclosure threshold x
∗(t) would gradually decline as p(t) 
increased prior to the public news release; that is, there would be no information blackout effect. 21 
B. Multiple firms 
A natural extension is a model with no external signal but with multiple firms. In that case 
the “news” might correspond to the information released by another firm in the same industry.  
Indeed, our analysis can be directly applied if the news is a non-discretionary information 
release, such as an earnings announcement.  Our model would then predict that after a negative 
earnings announcement, we should be more likely to observe discretionary announcements by 
other firms in the same industry. 
While more complicated, one could also extend our model to the case of multiple firms in 
which all firms have discretion.   For simplicity suppose there are two symmetric firms: A and B 
whose signals are given by 
A S   and 
B S .  As we shall see the equilibrium is similar to the 
equilibrium of stochastic news arrival that we have just examined. However, the construction of 
the equilibrium presents a significant computational challenge.  
The key observation is the fact that from firms A’s perspective, B’s signal is an external 
signal. Let γ
Β(t | S
B) denote the equilibrium arrival density of B’s disclosure conditional on B’s 
signal, so that the probability that B will disclose in the interval between t and t + dt, given that it 
has not yet disclosed, is γ
Β(t | S
B)dt. 
Consider firm A’s decision whether to preempt and release its information at time t  as 
compared to the alternative of waiting until t + dt. A’s decision to disclose is similar to the case 
of stochastic arrival of an external signal: 
( ) ( ) ( )
*1 * * () () () (| ) () ( ,) ( ) ().
BB B A
t uxt uv t t E tS uxS t uS d S xt
+ ∞ −   = +λ γ λ τ − τ =    ∫
 
Once the threshold x
∗(t)  is determined, it will then determine the arrival density of A’s 
announcement, γ
Α(t | S
A).  A symmetric equilibrium then requires the solution of the additional 
fixed point problem (γ
A = γ
B), which is computationally quite challenging.    In such a setting, we 
conjecture that our qualitative results regarding immediate disclosure would continue to apply 
and would lead to the clustering of news announcements by firms, with clustering more likely 
the more negative the news. 22 
C. Alternative Payoffs and Relative Performance 
We have assumed so far that the manager’s payoff depends only upon the expected value of 
the firm conditional on the manager’s information. This setting corresponds, for example, to a 
situation in which the firm’s value is a sufficient statistic for the manager’s ability, and this 
ability determines the manager’s outside option.   
A natural alternative setting to consider is one in which the manager’s ability determines the 
firm’s relative rather than absolute performance.  For example, suppose S = Y + α, where Y 
represents a measure of industry performance and α represents the manager’s ability. In that 
case, the news Y  provides information in addition to S  regarding the manager’s ability and 
appropriate compensation.  Nonetheless, we argue that the qualitative conclusions of our model 
continue to apply in this alternative setting.   
To see why, let Y and α be independent and joint normal.  Suppose first that Y is revealed at t 
= 0 and there is no possibility of preemption. Because α  =  S  − Y, we can reinterpret the 
manager’s signal as α and it is immediate that the disclosure threshold α
∗(t) and therefore the 
disclosure rate will not depend on Y.  Thus, our results in Subsection I.C carry through as before.  
Now suppose that Y is realized at t = 1 so that S can be disclosed before Y is revealed.  The 
equilibrium in this case will be similar to our analysis in Section II. Note that the conditional 
expectation of α given S is a linear function of S.   The disclosure threshold x
∗(0) at date 0 will 
reflect a real option premium (i.e., x
∗(0) > v(0)), as the agent with type S = v(0) would regret 
disclosing if Y is sufficiently high (specifically, if S − Y < α
∗(1)).   As in our current model, at 
date t = 1 there will be a positive probability of immediate disclosure if the market news Y is 
sufficiently low (so that Y + α
∗(1) < x
∗(0)).  On the other hand, if Y is high, disclosure will be 
delayed.  Thus, all of the qualitative conclusions of our model continue to hold if the agent is 
compensated based on relative rather than absolute performance.   
V.  Implications for Asset Pricing  
There is some empirical evidence about the link between voluntary disclosure and stock price 
reactions.   This literature faces the challenge that unlike mandatory disclosures (e.g. earning 
announcements) there is not a readily available dataset for voluntary disclosures. Few papers rely 23 
on hand collected data while others rely just on asset pricing data.  Miller (2002) examines a 
comprehensive set of disclosures from a sample of firms experiencing an extended period of 
earnings increases that is followed by a decline in earning. He finds an increase in disclosure 
during the period of increased earnings. This increase is pervasive across all types of disclosure 
and tends to be bundled with earnings announcements. The market responds positively to these 
disclosures. Once the earnings start to decline there is also a decline in the disclosure rate; again 
the market reacts accordingly. Tse and Tucker (2007) estimate duration model for earning 
warnings. They find that earnings warnings within industries are clustered and that firms speed up 
their warnings in response to peer firms’ warnings. A more recent paper by Kothari, Shu and 
Wysocki (2009) focuses  on asset pricing and finds  evidence consistent with the view that 
managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately 
reveal good news to investors and that the market reacts accordingly – specifically, prices tend to 
drift downward absent disclosure, and jump upward with the announcement of good news.   
Finally, Salomon (2009) presents interesting evidence that investor relations firms “spin” their client 
firms’ news, generating greater media coverage of positive press releases relative to neutral or 
negative press releases, increasing announcement returns around news. 
An important implication of our results is that with strategic timing of disclosures by 
managers, the process of information arrival to markets is different from the process of 
information arrival to firms and managers.  For instance, the underlying information process may 
have constant variability over time and no skewness, but this need not be true of the process 
describing disclosed information.  Below, we discuss the specific implications of our dynamic 
disclosure model for the skewness and volatility of observed stock returns.   
Return Skewness.  The dynamic model of strategic delay developed in Section III of the 
paper implies that individual stock returns will tend to exhibit positive skewness, as firms tend to 
release good news quickly but delay the disclosure of bad news until the price drifts down 
sufficiently that the news no longer is a negative surprise.  The average positive skewness in 
individual stock returns was documented early by Beedles (1979) and is reproduced for more 
recent data in Figure 4.  Such positive skewness should disappear in our model at the point that 
p(t) = 1 and full disclosure occurs.  This pattern is consistent with McNichols (1988), who finds 
less positive skewness in earnings announcement periods (when disclosures are likely to be 24 
involuntary) compared to non-announcement periods (when disclosures are more likely to be 
strategic).   
While this effect of disclosure timing on  average  positive skewness  of individual stock 
returns has been suggested elsewhere (for example, in Damodaran, 1985), our model with public 
news implies an important, additional conditional pattern.  In periods without public news, stock 
returns will be positively skewed as the firm voluntarily releases good news.  When public news 
is announced, however, returns will be negatively skewed.  The reason is that when the public 
news is good,  it is more likely that the firm would have preemptively released good news, 
mitigating the effect of the news on the stock price.  When the public news is bad, however, the 
firm is less likely to have previously disclosed its information, in which case the stock’s return 
will respond to the public news fully.  Figure 3 illustrates this result, showing the skewness of 
the stock’s returns prior to the news release as well as on the release date, for different levels of 
correlation between the stock and the news (and the same parameters as in Figure 1).   
 
Figure 3:  Skewness of Stock Return Prior to News and Upon Annoucement 
 
Conditional Correlation (Beta).  This asymmetry in the response of disclosures to the nature 
of public news implies that individual stock returns will be more sensitive to aggregate market 
news when the market news is negative.  This implication also finds empirical support.  Ang and 






















Correlation of S and Y
Prior to News News Release Date25 
much greater for downside moves, especially for extreme downside moves, than for upside 
moves, and that these correlations differ from the conditional correlations implied by a normal 
distribution.  Interestingly, they find that the downside correlation is stronger for small stocks, 
where managerial ability to strategically time disclosures may be greater due to investor 
inattention, and for past loser stocks, where there may be greater adverse information that is 
being delayed for release until market news arrives. 
Further, the asymmetry in response to public news and the resulting downside correlation of 
firm returns helps explain the empirical result that while individual stock returns tend to be 
positively skewed  on average, stock market indices tend to have negatively skewed returns 
(Alles and Kling, 1994, and also see Figure 4 for recent evidence regarding index returns).
11
 
  The 
existing literature has found it hard to reconcile the differential nature of skewness in firm-level 
and market-level stock returns, and in fact, often interpreted the difference as lack of consensus 
on evidence of skewness.  In contrast, this differential pattern of skewness in returns arises 
naturally in our model. 
Figure 4:  Positive skewness of individual stock returns and negative skewness of index returns 
                                                 
11 Consistent with this asymmetry in skewness of returns between individual stocks and the market, Tauchen and 
Zhu (2009) document that realized jumps for individual stock returns are on average slightly positive, whereas for 
the market equity returns are on average negative. 





















The figure shows the fraction of up (positive stock return) days as a function of absolute 
stock return divided by the trailing volatility of stock returns (computed as the standard deviation 
of returns over the prior 100 days).  The dotted line shows the fraction of up days for each stock 
on the New York Stock Exchange over the period 1998-2007 and averaged across all stocks.  
The solid line plots the fraction calculated for a value-weighted index of stock returns over the 
same period.  Note that the majority of large moves for individual stocks tend to be positive, 
whereas large moves in the index tend to be negative. 
Volatility and the Leverage Effect.  Finally, our result regarding the acceleration of 
disclosure after bad market news implies that return volatility will increase after negative shocks. 
This is consistent with the so-called “leverage effect” (Black, 1976) that conditional on negative 
returns, return volatility is higher. In the most striking evidence of this effect, Officer (1973) and 
Schwert (1989, 1990) document that the stock market’s return variability has been unusually 
high during downturns such as the Great Depression of 1929-33 and the stock market crash of 
1987. They contend that the amplitude of the fluctuations in aggregate stock volatility is difficult 
to explain using simple models of stock valuation, especially during downturns. Furthermore, the 
feature that stock return volatility is stochastic and negatively correlated with the level of returns, 
is now considered essential in explaining observed option prices. For example, Heston (1993) 
shows that a stochastic volatility model where shocks to volatility are negatively correlated to 
shocks to returns can fit index option prices well in that it can explain the (Black-Scholes model-
based) implied volatility “skew” in index option prices.
12
Our model provides a potential explanation for these findings since the arrival of adverse 
public news during market downturns should accelerate the disclosure of information by firms 
and result in greater volatility. That is, our model treats the disclosure of information by firms as  
an  endogenous response to market downturns which causes volatility to rise. An alternative 
explanation of these effects is the “volatility feedback” hypothesis, formalized by Campbell and 
Hentschel (1992), which assumes that it is market volatility - rather than the market return - 
which receives exogenous, permanent shocks, that in turn, cause expected market return to rise, 
producing a contemporaneous negative return on the market. A differentiating feature of our 
 
                                                 
12 Implied volatility “skew” in index option prices describes the pattern that volatility numbers required in the Black-
Scholes model to fit observed index option prices exhibit a declining relationship with the option strike price.  This 
is now universally considered to be a violation of the Black-Scholes assumption that stock return volatility is 
constant over time or is deterministic. 27 
explanation relative to the volatility feedback channel is that we can simultaneously explain the 
positive skewness of individual stock returns (as explained above) and the negative skewness of 
market returns. In contrast, the volatility feedback implies negative skewness of market returns 
and lower negative skewness of individual stock returns: individual stock volatility also   
consists of idiosyncratic risk which does not command a risk premium, and hence, as Campbell 
and Hentschel note, is less affected by rise in market volatility.
13
To summarize, skewness and volatility related patterns observed in stock returns  are 
consistent with the dynamics of disclosures by firms and the incentives of managers who have 
discretion over disclosure timing.  In contrast to the existing literature which has often treated 
such patterns as a statistical artifact of data, our model provides a common information-theoretic 
foundation for their existence.
   
14
VI.  Conclusion 
  
In this paper, we provided a dynamic disclosure model in which the announcement of bad 
news hastens the disclosure of information by firms, resulting in bunching of disclosures. Since 
positive correlation of public news and firms’ private information is a critical factor driving this 
result, our model implies that disclosures should be more clustered  within industries and 
geographies, as empirically found by Tse and Tucker (2007) and Kedia and Rajgopal (2007), 
respectively. 
We assumed throughout our analysis that delaying disclosure is costless  for firms. In 
practice, non-disclosure might entail real costs since the firm would have to bypass observable 
activities warranted by this information, for example, continue to make investment even in 
response to adverse information about its prospects.
15
                                                 
13 See also Albuquerque (2010) who proposes an alternative explanation for differences between individual and 
aggregate skewness based on the discounting of cash flows between information release dates. 
  Another possibility is that there may be 
litigation risk associated with delay in releasing information.  Some researchers (Skinner, 1994, 
14 Shin (2003, 2006) also represent contributions that share this theme. Both papers consider single-firm (one-time) 
disclosure models with verifiable reports where a manager attempts to maximize the current share price and the 
markets rationally anticipate manager’s disclosure policy. The models generate implications such as the appearance 
of short-run momentum and long-run reversal in returns and the higher return variance following a poor disclosed 
outcome.  Rogers, Schrand and Verrecchia (2007) find evidence for some of the implications of Shin’s models for 
firm-level and market-level return and return volatility. 
15 Rajan (1994), for example, examines coordination and strategic delay in the recognition of bad loans by banks. He 
assumes that in order to hide bad loans, banks must continue lending or make new loans to the defaulted borrowers, 
which is costly in real terms.  28 
Trueman, 1997) have argued that litigation risk can explain why firms voluntarily disclose bad 
news.
16
An alternative motive for delayed disclosure that has been proposed is managerial short-
termism.  While our model of the manager’s objective is general enough to include such features, 
it is interesting to note that in our setting  the impact of short-termism is ambiguous.  For 
example, decreasing the weight λ(t) that the manager puts on the stock price after the public 
announcement (t > 1) will reduce the real option effect of delay and lead to greater disclosure in 
period 0. 
  Conversely, there might also be strategic benefits to a firm from not disclosing 
information when such information has not yet reached its competitors or the market as a whole.  
Dierker (2002) analyzes a dynamic disclosure model with such considerations.  Modeling more 
explicitly the cost or benefits of non-disclosure within our framework could potentially lead to 
further empirical predictions.  We leave such an extension for future work. 
Finally, we argued that our  dynamic disclosure game has  interesting asset-pricing 
implications  for skewness and volatility of firm-level and market-wide stock returns.    Fully 
establishing the empirical link between strategic timing of disclosures and these features of stock 
returns appears to be a promising line of enquiry for further work.   
                                                 
16 Such effects are captured to some extent in a reduced-form fashion in our model by the parameter q, which 
represents the likelihood with which the firm has no discretion over the release of its information. 29 
Appendix 
Proof of PROPOSITION 5:  Because the payoff from non-disclosure does not depend on the 
firm’s true type, it is immediate that the optimal strategy can be expressed as a threshold.  
Because p(t) is increasing, the optimal threshold in (14) is decreasing with t.  As a result, only 
the current threshold is relevant in determining the firm’s market value absent disclosure, which 
is given by  () ( * () , () ) S vt h x t t = ρ .  Finally, because v(t) also declines with t, it is optimal for the 
firm to disclose if and only if S exceeds v(t), and so 
*() xt is indeed an equilibrium threshold.   
To see that the equilibrium is unique, note that by the same reasoning as in the static case, 
any equilibrium must involve a threshold strategy (the gain from disclosure is increasing in 
type).  Let x(t) be some other disclosure policy, and let v(t) be the market value of the firm in the 
event of non-disclosure under this policy.  Note first that if x(t) is an equilibrium, and if t′ > t, 
then 
  x(t) ≥ v(t) ≥ x
∗(t) ≥ x
∗(t′).  (18) 
The first inequality follows because the manager would not disclose if it would lower the 
current share price.  The second follows because, from PROPOSITION 1, the share price x
∗(t) is 
the lowest possible share price under any beliefs regarding the manager’s disclosure policy.  
Finally, the last follows because x
∗(t) is weakly decreasing. 
Next we claim that  
  x(t) = v(t) if and only if x(t) = x
∗(t).  (19) 
To see the “if,” note with this disclosure threshold at date t, because x(t) = x
∗(t) < x(s) for all s 
< t from (18), the set of non-disclosing firms is precisely the same as the set that is privately 
informed with S < x
∗(t), and thus x
∗(t) = h(x
∗(t), ρ(t)) = v(t).  The “only if” follows because, as in 
the static case, this fixed point is unique (lowering the threshold from any fixed point must raise 
the share price). 




 t′ > t
 } > x(t) (it pays to delay 
disclosure only if a higher price can be obtained in the future from not disclosing).  But then 30 
because x(t
∗) = v(t
∗) (there is no reason to delay at t




∗) ≤ x(t), a contradiction.  \qed 
Proof of PROPOSITION 6: Let  (,) vYt denote the expected value in equilibrium of a type 
that does not disclose at some  1 tt > . Following the same reasoning as in PROPOSITION 5, 
we know that there is no real option value after the news is revealed, so this expected 
value equals the threshold for disclosure,  (,) (,) xYt vYt = . Also, because ρ(t) is 
increasing, x(Y,t) and therefore  (,) vYt is decreasing in t for  1 tt > . 
A firm that has not disclosed prior to  1 t   will choose to do so at  1 tt >  if its type exceeds
(,) xYt . When
*
min (,) np x Yt x < ,.one equilibrium is 
* (,) (,) np xYt x Yt = ; in this case the ex-
ante disclosure decision has no impact on the set firms that have disclosed by date t.  
Furthermore, following Proposition 1, we know that this equilibrium is unique.  In 
contrast, when 
*
min (,) np x Yt x > we do find types that may have disclosed prior to  1 t  for 
whom  (,) vYt S > . Since 
* (,) np x Yt represent the worst belief we have that 
* (,) (,) (,) np xYt x Yt KYt = +  for some positive  (,) KYt.   (,) KYt is increasing in Y by the 
same reasoning as PROPOSITION 3.  \qed 
Sufficient Conditions for the Optimality of an Ex-Ante Threshold (Subsection II.C): 
Here we demonstrate optimality of a  threshold strategy prior to the public news 
announcement for a special case in which the news and signal are joint normal and the manager’s 
payoff function u(v) = v.  While a general proof of optimality is beyond our scope here, it is easy 
to verify numerically the optimality of a threshold strategy for a broad range of examples.  
Moreover, note that none of the qualitative results in the paper depend on a threshold strategy 
prior to the news announcement. 
We need to show that if condition (11) holds for some type S, it holds for all higher types.  
Now, the left hand side of (11) clearly increases with S.  Thus, it is sufficient to show that the 
right hand side of (11) weakly decreases with S.  Without loss of generality let Y and Z be 31 
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are independent.  Therefore, 
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  (19) 
This condition obviously holds if Y ≤ y0, since then k′ = 0.  Consider the case Y = y > y0 and 
therefore
**






, and letting R
2 be the regression R-squared from a regression of S and Y, we can 
write (20) as 
    ( )
2
2 , Z hz
σ ′ ρ ≥−
β








  (19) 
Thus, a weak sufficient condition for the optimality of the threshold policy is  











  (19) 
The right-hand side of (22) is decreasing in ρ, and is equal to 0.51 for ρ = 20.  Thus, the 
condition is satisfied for ρ ∈ [0, 20] if R
2 < 0.5. 
Of course, this condition is extremely weak, in part because we have required monotonicity 
of the right-hand side of (11) state-by-state, rather than in expectation.  Indeed, in the extreme 
alternative case R
2 = 1, it is easy to see that a threshold strategy is optimal:  Y is then a perfect 
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